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Hume's Skepticism |
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Of the Origin of Ideas The Principle of the Priority of Impressions ·
That reason judges only matters of fact and
relations. This distinction
is found in Hume's epistemology, in which he argues that reason is impotent
to judge or determine anything regarding issues that are not either relations
of ideas or matters of fact.
This distinction can be seen in his argument that the principles of
universal causation and nature's uniformity are not grounded in reason. They are, instead, objects of faith
or belief. The argument runs,
generally, as follows: 1. All
the objects of human reason are either relations of ideas or matters of
fact. The distinction here is
between necessary truths and contingent truths. 2. The
principle of nature's uniformity, that the future will resemble the past, is
not a relation of ideas because its denial is conceivable. It is conceivable that the future
will not resemble the past. 3. Therefore,
the PNU must be a matter of fact, i.e., it must be verifiable in our
experience. 4. But,
the PNU is not a matter of fact, since it can never be verified in our
experience. That is, there is no
guarantee that the future will resemble the past. 5. Therefore,
the PNU is not an object of our reason or knowledge. The
question now remains what it is.
Hume asserts that it must be an object of belief or faith since it is
not grounded on reasoning or any process of human understanding. We believe strongly through custom
and habit that the future will resemble the past.
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