d'Holbach was a mechanistic materialist (so was Thomas Hobbes, whose
political theory we will address later in the semester). As such,
he held the position that everything in the universe is matter and ONLY
matter. All matter follows determinate physical laws, and these are
laws that have no exceptions in the physical world. It follows that
if matter is subject to laws, and laws determine the actions of things,
and if it is further true that literally EVERYTHING in the universe is
MATTER, then everything in the universe is subject to and determined by
universal physical laws.
Soft Determinism (also called Compatibilism) is a position held by A.J. Ayer, John Stuart Mill, and John Hospers (among many others). Those who hold this position believe that determinism (that everything has a cause) is compatible with free will.
There is a radical sort of theory which we can call "radical free will theory" that implies that nothing has any cause at all.
Then there is the position
of William James (Indeterminism) which is discussed, below.
What the determinist believes: there is only one course of events possible in the universe - the parts of the universe are already laid down in an absolute way - nothing occurs by chance or in a manner different from one that is already prescribed to happen. "Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible."
What the indeterminist holds: "Possibilities may be in excess of actualities" and "of two alternative futures . . ., both may now be really possible; and the one only become(s) impossible at the very moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself."
For the determinist, if there's a possibility that was never actualized, that means it was never really a possibility at all.
Who is right? The determinist or the indeterminist? Science cannot provide an answer. Science concerns facts - and "facts can only prove facts". The argument between determinists and indeterminists concerns possibilities, NOT FACTS, and so science can have nothing to do with the argument.
For the determinist, "chance" means something like "crazy unreason." For the indeterminist, chance simply means that something "is not guaranteed, that it may also (turn out) otherwise."
WJ does not claim that he can PROVE that this is a world of chance. "At most, we have agreed that it seems so. . . . From any strict theoretical point of view, the question is insoluble. To deepen our theoretic sense of the difference between a world with chances in it and a deterministic world is the most I can hope to do."
What is the status of judgments of regret?
How do these inform the dilemma of determinism?
Determinism implies pessimism
"Murder and treachery can't be good without regret
being bad; regret can't be good without treachery being and murder being
bad. Both, however, are supposed (by the determinist) to have been
foredoomed, so something must be bad in the world. It must
be a place of which either sin or error forms a necessary part. . . ."
"What interest, zest, or excitement can there
be in achieving the right way, unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong
way is also a possible and natural way -- nay, more, a menacing and an
imminent way?" How can we condemn ourselves or others for doing something
"wrong" unless there was a right way also open to us to choose?