Arthur Dyke, "An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia"

Generally "Accepted" Arguments for euthanasia:
    a.  Compassion for the painfully and terminally ill.
    b.  Concern for human dignity associated with freedom of choice.

Dyke's Position:
    Euthanasia does not promote compassion and human dignity.
        Proposes the alternative:  "benemortasia" - roots in "bene" (good) and "mort" (death) - but a different sort of connotation from that associated with the term 'euthanasia'

    Those who support "benemortasia" hold that death need not be painless or induced to be good.  There is a distinction between permitting death and causing death, and it makes a significant moral difference.

    Causing one's own death does violence to oneself and others (for the ethic of benemortasia):
        a.  Repudiates the meaning and worth of life for anyone.  It ends all choices about what one's life will 'symbolize'
                A question to consider:  Why should one's life symbolize anything?  Why should the way one dies repudiate the meaning and worth of life?

    b.  Ends the chance to make restitution, reparation, kindness and clarify misunderstandings.
                Another question:  Can't these things be done prior to the decision to end one's life voluntarily?  Is there too much weight being put on OTHERS rather than the SELF in these cases?

    c.  Suicide and support for it destroys the community.
                Another question:  Can it not be part of a community to respect the decisions of others?  Why can't it be the case that the way one dies is PART of a person's life and may be supportive of a community?

    d.  The example of the Nazis - holocaust began with the sick and frail
            Question:  a slippery slope argument?

    e.  For physicians to cause death is to abandon the principle to do no harm.
            Question:  would it be better if non-physicians were to administer lethal doses of medication, etc.?
 

James Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia"

    That active and passive euthanasia are not morally distinct - and neither are killing and letting die (the analogous cases).
            Argues that active E is morally preferable to passive E because passive E causes more suffering rather than less.
                        The example of the rich cousin - in the first case, he is drowned by his caretaker relative.  In the second case, he is allowed to drown by his caretaker relative.  In both cases, intent is identical - actions are different.  Is there any moral difference between the two cases?
                        There is clearly a moral difference between allowing suffering and ending suffering.
 

Some general considerations from Taking Sides:
    Faye Girsh:
        "When the state dictates how the most intimate and personal choices will be made, based on how some religious groups think it should be, then we as individuals and as a country are in serious trouble."

    Rita Marker:
        There may be a tendency to prefer the money saved by a cheap pill or injection to end the life of a seriously ill person rather than to save that person's life and spend thousands of health-care dollars.
        How can we expect people to be properly informed about the details of euthanasia when most people see their physicians for less than 10-20 minutes per visit?
 

Richard Brandt, "Defective Newborns and the Morality of Termination"
        There are times when causing a person's death is doing him a favor  -  example of Chinese soldiers and cyanide

    1.  The issue of consent is irrelevant regarding the case of fetuses who have no concpetion of self or interest in their continued survival.  Consider the case of a person offered the chance to allow for the continued existence of his brain, but no memory.  He would be indifferent to his own existence in that sense.
    The point is that a fetus at the end of the 1st trimester is in the same position as that of the person offered the continued existence of his brain with no memory - there is no sense in which a 3 month old fetus could or would consider itself the same as the same physical fetus 6 months later.
                Adult consent is important in two senses:  a) one is concerned with his or her own welfare, b) there is a feeling of security a person can have if he or she knows that decisions made about one's life are in his or her own hands rather than the decisions being made by others.

    2.  A newborn or fetus cannot suffer from insecurity.  The issue of consent is therefore irrelevant.  A fetus can't worry about what others will do to him.
        But what of the first case (concern with one's own welfare)?  The interests of a newborn or fetus are most likely better served if people of goodwill who have information regarding the child's likely future, make decisions for him.
                NOTE:  An analogy to power of attorney granted by a competent adult to some other for decisions to be made during a time of incapacitation.

    3.  If all this is true, there is no difference between a fetus and a child in the first few days of life.  Note:  Is there also no difference between a fetus and an aged or intellectually incapacitated adult?

    4.  Replacement people:
            Conditions:  Conception at time A will likely result in a defective fetus.  Conception is put off until time B.  It is impossible to conceive the SAME fetus at time A and at time B.  Does potential fetus A have a "right" to complain?  Should we complain for the non-existent potential fetus?
            Now change the condition a bit:  Conception has already occurred.  Fetus A now exists, but is defective.  If an abortion is performed now, conception at a later time is likely to result in a non-defective fetus.  WHERE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES?  Couldn't we argue that the defective fetus, once born and in a state of awareness of its conditions of existence, might actually COMPLAIN ABOUT BEING BROUGHT INTO THE WORLD?  (Such cases have actually occurred - wrongful birth)

    4.  Costs to others:  ships are deliberately built with a certain margin of safety.  The same goes for cars.  We engage in wars in which it is known that there will be risks to and loss of life.  We engage in activities that are dangerous for greater benefits.  So, does the continuation of the life of a seriously ill child take precedence over the college education of a healthy sibling?
    We do not live according to a principle stating that life is to be preserved no matter what the cost (ships, cars, wars).  Why should we do so in cases in which the birth and continued existence of a defective newborn will result in diminution of the quality of life for other family members?
 

A brief excursion into the abortion issue:
        A little bit of terminology:
                How is 'abortion' to be defined?  Will it make a difference?

Arguments for/against abortion:
 

General Arguments for	General Arguments against
Safer than childbirth	All surgeries are dangerous      Danger doesn't imply moral wrong, does it???
Women have a moral right to choose	Fetuses have a right to life
Fetuses are not yet persons	Fetuses are at least potential persons What constitutes personhood? What defines humanity? Genetic material?
Unwanted children aggravate the problem of poverty	???
Adoption is not that simple	Adoption is a better alternative
Unwanted pregnancy increases infant mortality	Abortion is murder of potential infants/persons
Women's rights argument - life, liberty, self-determination and freedom from harm	All humans have a right to life
Others:	Others: