Ethical Emotivism
There are two main lines of argument
in emotivism, one of which, I believe, is a critique of the other. A.J. Ayer presents one line of argument and
C.L. Stevenson presents the other. Ayer
claims, generally speaking, that ethical statements are devoid of factual
content since they do not satisfy the verifiability criterion. Strictly stated, this criterion demands that
for a statement to be meaningful, it must be, at least in principle, verifiable
in our experience.[1] This does not mean that it must actually
be verifiable, but that we know what observations would be necessary in order
to verify it. And for Ayer, there are
no observations or possible observations that can verify a statement like
"Stealing is wrong" since such a claim is simply to assert that the
speaker does not approve of stealing.
The claim does not even imply that anyone has ever stolen, or will ever
steal, anything. It simply gives the
emotional attitude or expression of the speaker. Thus, ethical statements are neither true nor false because they
are meaningless. Ayer, in short,
refuses to give to ethical judgments any more attention than to claim that they
can be used for purposes of moral exhortation, but it is in no way
necessary that they do so.
Stevenson, on the other hand,
attempts to make moral judgments take on a semblance of objectivity. Stevenson makes the claim that ethical
judgments can be considered objective, at least in the sense that they
can be the subject of logical discourse.
But at least one critic of this position does not agree, and his
reasons, if not perfect, are at least good enough reasons to believe that
Stevenson has not necessarily given to his position the objectivity that he
believes it requires. But before taking on the major
objections to Stevenson's emotivist ethics, it might be beneficial to see the
difference between the theories of Ayer and Stevenson on the issues. Where Ayer claims that ethical judgments
have no meaning, and no logical validity whatsoever, Stevenson claims that they
do. Where Ayer claims that moral
judgments are simply emotionally laden propositions with no claim to truth and
falsehood, Stevenson claims, at least in a vague way, that they can be true or
false in some sense relative to the individual who lays claim to them. I do not pretend, of course, that these are
the only differences between them, but they are significant to a further
explanation of the point at which their positions on emotivism diverge, and to
determine whose position deserves the most merit, if either does.
Ayer claims that "the presence
of an ethical symbol adds nothing to its factual content."[2] This is the case because when someone says
that 'x is wrong,' he is not making any further claim about x. I think that Ayer misses something here,
however. To say that 'x is wrong' is
not necessarily to claim that 'x occurred,' so it may be that the claim that 'x
is wrong' not only does not add anything to the concept of 'x,' it may be that
'x' does not exist at all. In this case,
Ayer may not have stated his claim quite as strongly as it could have been
stated. If, on the other hand, it is
true (as Ayer claims) that an ethical judgment can be considered true
when we consider whether the speaker does truly have the attitude expressed
in the ethical judgment, then ethical judgments can have a truth value. They would be true when the speaker claims
that he disapproves and does actually disapprove; but they would be
false when the speaker claims that he disapproves but actually does not. But this is not Ayer's position, and he
finds such a claim uninteresting given his contention that such exclamations as
'x is wrong' can be neither true nor false since the activity of evincing
feelings is not the same as saying that the speaker has those feelings.[3] But if we give to Ayer the claim that x
either has occurred or could occur, then the proclamation that 'x is a thing'
or that 'x is an action' can be verified, at least in principle, in our
experience, but the further claim that 'x has the characteristic of being
wrong' does nothing to add to the concept of x itself, since 'wrong' refers to
the emotions of the speaker. As Ayer
himself puts it, it is similar simply to saying something like, 'x, booh!' and
leaving it at that.
I think Stevenson sees the problem
attended with simply claiming that ethical judgments are emotional
exclamations. People do appear to argue
over ethical judgments, and the simple fact that people do agree or disagree
seems to lend credibility to the claim that there is something objective in
ethical judgments. Stevenson's
position, then, is an extension of that of Ayer, and is one that gives at least
the appearance of objectivity to ethical judgments. Ayer will not concede that there are arguments over values at
all. Stevenson claims there are, and
that it is possible (a point that Ayer will not concede) to continue to argue
even when two disputants know the relevant facts of a case, but still disagree
in attitude over whether the facts lead to their respective moral claims. Ayer claims that "we cannot bring
forward any arguments to show that our (value) system is superior. For our judgment that it is so is itself a
judgment of value, and accordingly outside the scope of argument."[4] Thus, even though it may be possible to
change someone's attitude regarding a particular ethical judgment through the
recognition that our ability to do so is based, at least in part, on our social
surroundings and upbringing, it may still be impossible, especially in a case
in which we try to convince someone from outside our culture, that 'x is
wrong.' What happens at that point is
that all dispute ceases, since the notion that 'x is wrong' is independent of
the factual statements that only appeared to lead to that claim.
Stevenson claims, however, that
ethical judgments have either imperative or prescriptive force. Imperative or prescriptive force
"consists in a capacity, causally dependent on the auditor's language
training, to mold the attitudes of auditors after the pattern of the attitude
expressed, independently of any beliefs the utterance may produce in the mind
of the auditor."[5] This is a statement of the 'dynamic' use of
ethical terms to which Stevenson attaches so much importance.[6]
In this regard, Stevenson claims that
there are three requirements that constitute the 'vital' sense of good that he
requires. They are that 1) we must be
able to disagree about whether something is good; 2) the ethical term or
judgment must have some 'magnetism', i.e., it must have the effect such that
anyone who hears it is more likely to act in accordance with it than against
it; and 3) it does not necessarily have to be verified or verifiable by the
scientific method.[7] In order to justify his claim that his
position on the emotive theory is the correct one, he makes a distinction
between the emotive meaning of an ethical judgment and its dynamic purpose.[8] The emotive meaning may very well be
indicative of the attitude of the speaker.
But the dynamic purpose is not part of the meaning.
Dynamic purpose lies outside the scope
of meaning, and refers to the fact that "there is an important contingent
relation between emotive meaning and dynamic purpose: the former assists the latter.
Hence if we define emotively laden terms in a way that neglects their
emotive meaning, we become seriously confused.
We lead people to think that the terms defined are used dynamically
less often than they are.[9]
In
other words, the function of an ethical judgment is as a moral exhortation to
action or to a change in attitude. But
this is not a meaning of an ethical judgment, it is the use to which
it is put.
Stevenson's distinction between
disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude may roughly be given as a
disagreement between the facts and the way that anyone feels about them. One of the best examples of this is given in
Copi's Introduction to Logic in which he points out that two people may
disagree in belief, i.e., they may disagree that something has happened, or
that it is a fact, but when people disagree in attitude, they disagree not
necessarily about the facts, but they do disagree regarding the way in
which they feel about them. Thus, two
people, A and B, may both agree in belief that person C does not do much
work. A may claim, however, that C is
engaging in 'creative loafing' while B calls C 'lazy'. Their attitudes are different, but they both
agree about the relevant facts of the case, i.e., that C does little work. But if B, who thinks that C is lazy, wishes
to convince A that this is the case, the argument will proceed on a level in
which it is not necessary that more factual information be given, but
that B must, instead, use persuasive language in order to convince A
that he is right. This is the point at
which Stevenson disagrees strongly with interest theories and with Ayer's
position on the content of ethical judgments when he claims that "those
who argue that certain interest theories make no provision for disagreement
have been misled ... simply because the traditional theories, in leaving out
emotive meaning, give the impression that ethical judgments are used
descriptively only; and of course when judgments are used purely descriptively,
the only disagreement that can arise is disagreement in belief."[10]
Since Stevenson's theory includes
the interest of the speaker in defining 'good', it does have magnetism. It is possible for one person to influence
another simply through the appropriate pattern of speech.
For empirical method, Stevenson
claims that it is clearly possible that we can use facts to influence
people. In the case of A and B, who
cannot agree on whether C is lazy, if one were to point out that it is C's job
to work, not to engage in 'creative loafing', then it might be possible to
change A's attitude when A did not know that C was supposed to be working for a
corporation at the time at which he is seen not to be doing any work. But in a case in which A and B agree that
C is working for a corporation, but they continue to disagree about his
laziness, we have a situation in which it would seem that further argumentation
is fruitless. But Stevenson does not
contend that this is the case. In fact,
he contends that it may not be the case that a 'rational' method is used, but a
method of persuasion is used nonetheless.[11] In other words, B may attempt to change the
temperament of his opponent by stating the case in such an emotional way that A
will come over to his way of thinking.
Stevenson claims that such a method is "persuasive, not
empirical or rational; but that is no reason for neglecting it. There is no reason to scorn it, either, for
it is only by such means that our personalities are able to grow, through our
contact with others."[12] Thus Stevenson admits that further rational
argumentation is impossible, but that does not mean that argument stops. We do not simply sit back and claim that it
is simply a difference of opinion and there is nothing we can do to change
someone's mind. Much of our "moral
activity" is of the persuasive kind.
We are not usually interested simply in defining ethical terms (that is
a purely intellectual activity).
Instead, we are interested in making others share our attitudes so that
concerted action is possible. It is in
this sense, I believe, that we may claim that Stevenson is retaining the
'practical' nature of ethics, and removing it from the stuffy, intellectual
sphere into which it had been thrown after Moore's arguments became known.
Emotivism is certainly not to be
discarded as a theory of the use of ethical terms, but neither is it to be
accepted blindly. Carl Wellman claims
that Stevenson only makes emotivism appear to be objective, but does not
actually do so. As I see it, his
argument centers around five major issues.
First, Wellman claims that Stevenson's tireless work in attempting to
show that emotivism lays claim to objectivity is prima facie evidence
that ethics is objective, and therefore provides evidence that emotivism is not
a viable theory of ethics.[13]
The most persuasive of Wellman's
criticisms is that when Stevenson claims that we can say that ethical arguments
are valid due to their factual or descriptive content, he has missed the
point. If we grant that when a person
says that 'X is wrong' because 1) I believe that anything that does Y is wrong
and 2) X does Y, that person only appears to be making a moral claim. In fact, the argument can be formulated in
the following way.
Anything that does Y is wrong.
X does Y.
Therefore X is wrong.
In making such an argument, one
reverts back to the first formulation.
The first formulation does nothing but express the attitude of the
speaker, and is therefore analogous to the second form of the argument. If this is the case, then the claim that 'x
is wrong' on the basis of my disapproval does nothing to establish the claim
that, emotively, 'x is wrong.' The
factual part of the argument, that this person really does claim that x is
wrong, adds nothing to the ethical value of the conclusion. As Wellman puts
it, "it is only in the most uninteresting sense that formal logic applies
to even the simplest and most straightforward ethical argument, for the
validity of the argument does nothing whatsoever to establish the ethical
import of the conclusion in question."[14] Of course, Stevenson would disagree since he
claims that 'wrong' has a dynamic use, that, I believe, means that the use of
the word 'wrong' serves to influence, not to 'prove' in the strict
sense. But Wellman anticipates such an
objection, and claims that Stevenson's argument "still does not show how
the ethical import of the definition (gets) transferred to the conclusion of
the argument..."[15]
Furthermore, it is not always the
case that a declarative sentence can be given as being strictly true or
false. Wellman gives the example of the
university catalogue which states that 'no student shall drink alcoholic
beverages on campus.' This statement is
neither true nor false. Rules are
neither true nor false; they simply serve as guides to behavior.[16]
Fourth, the epistemic terms 'true'
and 'false' have a 'critical meaning.'[17] They are terms related to the degree to
which reasons for or against a claim are given as good. Stevenson simply claims that a reason is
relevant when it serves to strengthen or weaken the claims of the hearer; but Wellman appears to assert that Stevenson
cannot claim any kind of objectivity for an ethical claim unless the reasons
for the claim are also ones that can be true or false. Thus, if the reasons are purely emotive, so
is the conclusion, and there is no real, epistemic sense in which Stevenson
uses those terms.
Stevenson also claims that the
appearance of rational argumentation is useful in that rationality serves to
produce stable attitudes. But Wellman
argues against this claim in his contention that there are times when
'irrational' argumentation is more useful than the rational -- in a case, for
example, when someone is contemplating suicide -- so that Stevenson has made
his arguments pragmatic rather than emotive.
In this case, of course, we can note that considerations of utility are
not necessarily considerations of rationality.
I think it might be safe to say,
then, that if Wellman is right and Stevenson is wrong, Stevenson's position
becomes that of A.J. Ayer, and is then subject to the same pitfalls that Stevenson
sees in Ayer's position. In other
words, Stevenson cannot claim any form of objectivity, but unlike Wellman, I do
not believe that Stevenson must give up emotivism. He must, however, give to ethical judgments no more credibility
than Ayer gave to them.
[2]A.J. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics"
in Sellars and Hospers Readings in Ethical Theory, (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 245. [Reprinted from Language, Truth and
Logic].
[5]"The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company,
1968), p. 494.
[6]A possible criticism of the emotive theory
of ethics is that its adherents tend to claim that terms like 'right' and
'good' are given meaning in the emotive theory by their 'ordinary' use. This cannot be the case in every
case, since we may assert that 'If it is right to..., then...', but the word
'right' does not seem to be expressing or prescribing the speaker's attitudes
in any way. Thus, even though this is
an 'ordinary' use of the word 'right', it is not an emotive use in this case. (Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, p. 496).