|
Ethical Emotivism The text of this paper was
placed on this web-site with the permission of the author. Copyright ã 2001, Nancy A. Stanlick There are two main lines of
argument in emotivism, one of which is a critique of the other. A.J. Ayer presents one line of argument.
C.L. Stevenson presents the other.
Ayer claims that ethical statements are devoid of factual content
since they do not satisfy the verifiability criterion. Strictly stated, this criterion demands
that for a statement to be meaningful, it must be, at least in principle,
verifiable in our experience.(1) This
does not mean that it must actually be verifiable, but that we know
what observations would be necessary in order to verify it. And for Ayer, there are no observations or
possible observations that can verify a statement like "Stealing is
wrong" since the claim simply asserts that the speaker does not approve
of stealing. The claim does not even
imply that anyone has ever stolen, or will ever steal, anything. It simply gives the emotional attitude or
expression of the speaker. Ethical
statements are, then, neither true nor false because they are
meaningless. Ayer, in short, refuses
to give to ethical judgments any more attention than to claim that they can
be used for purposes of moral exhortation, but it is in no way necessary that
they do so. Stevenson, on the other hand,
attempts to make moral judgments take on a semblance of objectivity. Stevenson makes the claim that ethical
judgments can be considered objective, at least in the sense that they
can be the subjects of logical discourse.
But at least one critic of this position does not agree, and his
reasons, if not perfect, are at least good enough reasons to believe that
Stevenson has not necessarily given to his position the objectivity he
believes it requires. But before
taking on the major objections to Stevenson's emotivist ethics, it might be
beneficial to see the difference between the theories of Ayer and Stevenson
on the issues. Where Ayer claims that
ethical judgments have no meaning whatsoever, Stevenson claims that they
do. Where Ayer claims that moral
judgments are simply emotionally laden propositions with no claim to truth
and falsehood, Stevenson claims, at least in a vague way, that they can be
true or false in some sense relative to the individual who lays claim to
them. I do not pretend, of course,
that these two are the only differences between them, but they are
significant for a further explanation of the point at which their positions
on emotivism diverge, and to determine whose position is most complete and
accurate as a view of the status of ethical judgments. Ayer claims that "the
presence of an ethical symbol adds nothing to its factual content."(2) This is the case because when someone says
that 'x is wrong,' he is not making any further claim about x. I think that Ayer misses something here,
however. To say that 'x is wrong' is
not necessarily to claim that 'x occurred,' so it may be that the claim 'x is
wrong' not only does not add anything to the concept of 'x,' it may be that
'x' does not exist at all. In this
case, Ayer may ---------------------------------- (1)
A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York: Dover Publications,
1952), p. 36. (2) A.J. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics" in Sellars
and Hospers Readings in Ethical Theory, (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 245. [Reprinted from Language, Truth
and Logic]. (PAGE 1) |
|
not
have stated his claim quite as strongly as it could have been stated. If, on the other hand, it is true (as Ayer
claims) that an ethical judgment can be considered true when we know the
speaker does have the attitude expressed in the ethical judgment, then
ethical judgments can have a truth value.
They would be true when the speaker claims that he disapproves and does
actually disapprove; but they would be false when the speaker claims that
he disapproves but actually does not disapprove. But this is not Ayer's position, and he
finds this uninteresting given his contention that exclamations such as 'x is
wrong' can be neither true nor false since the activity of evincing feelings
is not the same as saying that the speaker has those feelings.(3) But if we give to Ayer the claim that x
either has occurred or could occur, then the proclamation that 'x is a thing'
or that 'x is an action' can be verified, at least in principle, in our
experience, but the further claim that 'x has the characteristic of being
wrong' does nothing to add to the concept of x itself, since 'wrong' refers
to the emotions of the speaker. As
Ayer himself puts it, it is similar to saying something like, 'x, booh!' and
leaving it at that. I think Stevenson sees the problem
attended with claiming that ethical judgments are only emotional
exclamations. People do appear to argue
over ethical judgments, and the simple fact that people do agree or disagree
seems to lend credibility to the claim that there is something objective in
ethical judgments. Stevenson's
position, then, is an extension of that of Ayer, and is one that gives at least
the appearance of objectivity to ethical judgments. Ayer will not concede that there are arguments over values at
all. Stevenson claims there are, and
that it is possible (a point that Ayer will not concede) to continue to argue
even when two disputants know the relevant facts of a case, but still
disagree in attitude over whether the facts lead to their respective moral
claims. Ayer claims that "we
cannot bring forward any arguments to show that our (value) system is
superior. For our judgment that it is
so is itself a judgment of value, and accordingly outside the scope of
argument."(4) Thus, even
though it may be possible to change someone's attitude regarding a particular
ethical judgment through the recognition that our ability to do so is based,
at least in part, on our social surroundings and upbringing, it may still be
impossible, especially in a case in which we try to convince someone from
outside our culture, that 'x is wrong.'
What happens at that point is that all dispute ceases, since the
notion that 'x is wrong' is independent of the factual statements that only appeared
to lead to that claim. Stevenson claims, however, that ethical judgments have
either imperative or prescriptive force.
Imperative or prescriptive force "consists in a capacity, causally
dependent on the auditor's language training, to mold the ---------------------------- (3) Ayer in Sellars and Hospers,
"Critique of Ethics", p. 246. (4) Ayer
in Sellars and Hospers, p. 248. (PAGE 2) |
|
attitudes
of auditors after the pattern of the attitude expressed, independently of any
beliefs the utterance may produce in the mind of the auditor."(5) This is a statement of the 'dynamic'
use of ethical terms to which Stevenson attaches so much importance.(6) In this regard, Stevenson claims
that there are three requirements that constitute the 'vital' sense of good
that he requires of ethical judgments.
They are that 1) we must be able to disagree about whether something
is good; 2) the ethical term or judgment must have some 'magnetism', i.e., it
must have the effect such that anyone who hears it is more likely to act in
accordance with it than against it; and 3) it does not necessarily have to be
verified or verifiable by the scientific method.(7) To justify his claim that his position
on the emotive theory is correct, he makes a distinction between the emotive
meaning of an ethical judgment and its dynamic purpose.(8) The emotive meaning may very well be
indicative of the attitude of the speaker.
But the dynamic purpose is not part of the meaning. Dynamic purpose lies outside
the scope of meaning, and refers to the fact that “there is an important
contingent relation between emotive meaning and dynamic purpose: the former assists the latter. Hence if we define emotively laden terms
in a way that neglects their emotive meaning, we become seriously confused. We lead people to think that the terms
defined are used dynamically less often than they are. (9) In
other words, the function of an ethical judgment is as a moral exhortation to
action or to a change in attitude.
But this is not a meaning of an ethical judgment, it is the
use to which it is put. Stevenson’s distinction between
disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude may roughly be given as a
disagreement between the facts and the way anyone feels about them. One of the best examples of this is given
in Copi’s Introduction to Logic in which two people may disagree in
belief, i.e., they may disagree that something has happened, or that it is a
fact, but when people disagree in attitude, they disagree not necessarily
about the facts, ---------------------------- (5) “The Emotive Theory of
Ethics” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 494. (6) A possible
criticism of the emotive theory of ethics is that its adherents tend to claim
that terms like ‘right’ and ‘good’ are given meaning in the emotive theory by
their ‘ordinary’ use. This cannot be
the case in every case, since we may assert that ‘If it is right
to..., then...’, but the word ‘right’ does not seem to be expressing or
prescribing the speaker’s attitudes in any way. Thus, even though this is an ‘ordinary’ use of the word
‘right’, it is not an emotive use in this case. (Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, p. 496). (7) C.L. Stevenson, “The Emotive
Meaning of Ethical Terms”, in Sellars and Hospers, pp. 255-256. (8) Stevenson in Sellars and
Hospers, p. 261. (9) Stevenson in Sellars and
Hospers, p. 261. (PAGE 3) |
|
but
they do disagree regarding the way in which they feel about them. Thus, two people, A and B, may both agree
in belief that person C does not do much work. A may claim, however, that C is engaging in ‘creative loafing’
while B calls C ‘lazy’. Their
attitudes are different, but they both agree about the relevant facts of the
case, i.e., that C does little work.
But if B, who thinks that C is lazy, wishes to convince A that this is
the case, the argument will proceed on a level in which it is not necessary
that more factual information be given, but that B must, instead, use persuasive
language in order to convince A that he is right. This is the point at which Stevenson disagrees strongly with
interest theories and with Ayer’s position on the content of ethical
judgments when he claims that “those who argue that certain interest theories
make no provision for disagreement have been misled ... simply because the
traditional theories, in leaving out emotive meaning, give the impression
that ethical judgments are used descriptively only; and of course when
judgments are used purely descriptively, the only disagreement that can arise
is disagreement in belief.”(10) Since Stevenson’s theory includes
the interest of the speaker in defining ‘good’, it does have magnetism. It is possible for one person to influence
another simply through the appropriate pattern of speech. For empirical method, Stevenson
claims that it is clearly possible that we can use facts to influence
people. In the case of A and B, who
cannot agree on whether C is lazy, if one were to point out that it is C’s
job to work, not to engage in ‘creative loafing’, then it might be possible
to change A’s attitude when A did not know that C was supposed to be working
for a corporation at the time at which he is seen not to be doing any
work. But in a case in which A and B agree
that C is working for a corporation, but they continue to disagree about
his laziness, we have a situation in which it would seem that further
argumentation is fruitless. But
Stevenson does not contend that this is the case. In fact, he contends that it may not be the case that a
‘rational’ method is used, but a method of persuasion is used nonetheless.(11) In other words, B may attempt to change
the temperament of his opponent by stating the case in such an emotional way
that A will come over to his way of thinking. Stevenson claims that such a method is “persuasive, not
empirical or rational; but that is no reason for neglecting it. There is no reason to scorn it, either,
for it is only by such means that our personalities are able to grow, through
our contact with others.”(12)
Thus Stevenson admits that further rational argumentation is impossible,
but that does not mean that argument
stops. We do not simply sit back and
claim that it is a ---------------------------- (10) Stevenson
in Sellars and Hospers, p. 263. (11) Stevenson in Sellars and
Hospers, p. 265. (12) Stevenson in Sellars and
Hospers, p. 265 (Emphasis added). (PAGE 4) |
|
difference
of opinion and there is nothing we can do to change someone’s mind. Much of our “moral activity” is of the
persuasive kind. We are not usually
interested exclusively in defining ethical terms (that is a purely intellectual
activity). Instead, we are interested
in making others share our attitudes so that concerted action is
possible. It is in this sense, I
believe, that we may claim that Stevenson is retaining the ‘practical’ nature
of ethics, and removing it from the stuffy, intellectual sphere into which it
had been thrown after Moore’s arguments became known. Emotivism is certainly not to be
discarded as a theory of the use of ethical terms, but neither is it to be
accepted blindly. Carl Wellman claims
that Stevenson only makes emotivism appear to be objective, but does not
actually do so. As I see it, his
argument centers around five major issues.
First, Wellman claims that Stevenson’s tireless work in attempting to
show that emotivism lays claim to objectivity is prima facie evidence
that ethics is objective, and therefore provides evidence that emotivism is
not a viable theory of ethics.(13) The most persuasive of Wellman’s
criticisms is that when Stevenson claims that we can say that ethical
arguments are valid due to their factual or descriptive content, he
has missed the point. If we grant
that when a person says that ‘X is wrong’ because 1) I believe that anything
that does Y is wrong and 2) X does Y, that person only appears to be making a
moral claim. In fact, the argument
can be formulated in the following way.
Anything that does Y is wrong. X does Y. Therefore X is wrong. In making such an argument, one
reverts back to the first formulation.
The first formulation does nothing but express the attitude of the
speaker, and is therefore analogous to the second form of the argument. If this is the case, then the claim that
‘x is wrong’ on the basis of my disapproval does nothing to establish the
claim that, emotively, ‘x is wrong.’
The factual part of the argument, that this person really does
claim that x is wrong, adds nothing to the ethical value of the
conclusion. As Wellman puts it, “it is only in the most uninteresting sense
that formal logic applies to even the simplest and most straightforward ethical
argument, for the validity of the argument does nothing whatsoever to
establish the ethical import of the conclusion in question.” (14) Of course, Stevenson would disagree since
he claims that ‘wrong’ has a dynamic use, that, I believe, means that the use
of the word ‘wrong’ serves to influence, not to ‘prove’ in the strict
sense. But Wellman anticipates such an
objection, and claims that Stevenson’s argument “still does not show how the
ethical import of the definition (gets) transferred to the conclusion of the (13)
Wellman, p. 280. (14) Wellman, p. 280 (PAGE 5) |
|
argument...”(15)
Furthermore, it is not always the
case that a declarative sentence can be strictly true or false. Wellman gives the example of the
university catalogue, which states that ‘no student shall drink alcoholic
beverages on campus.’ This statement
is neither true nor false. Rules are
neither true nor false; they simply serve as guides to behavior.(16) Fourth, the epistemic terms ‘true’
and ‘false’ have a ‘critical meaning.’(17) They are terms related to the degree to which reasons for or
against a claim are given as good.
Stevenson simply claims that a reason is relevant when it serves to
strengthen or weaken the claims of the hearer; but Wellman appears to assert
that Stevenson cannot claim any kind of objectivity for an ethical claim
unless the reasons for the claim are also ones that can be true or
false. Thus, if the reasons are purely
emotive, so is the conclusion, and there is no real, epistemic sense in which
Stevenson uses those terms. Stevenson also claims that the
appearance of rational argumentation is useful in that rationality serves to
produce stable attitudes. But Wellman
argues against this claim in his contention that there are times when
‘irrational’ argumentation is more useful than the rational – in a case, for
example, when someone is contemplating suicide – so that Stevenson has made
his arguments pragmatic rather than emotive.
In this case, of course, we can note that considerations of utility
are not necessarily considerations of rationality. I think it might be safe to say,
then, that if Wellman is right and Stevenson is wrong, Stevenson’s position
becomes that of A.J. Ayer, and is then subject to the same pitfalls that
Stevenson sees in Ayer’s position. In
other words, Stevenson cannot claim any form of objectivity, but unlike
Wellman, I do not believe that Stevenson must give up emotivism. He must, however, give to ethical
judgments no more credibility than Ayer gave to them. (15)
Wellman, p. 281. (16)
Wellman, p. 281. (17)
Wellman, p. 283 (PAGE 6) |
|
END OF DOCUMENT |