What can give anyone authorized power over others like governors have over the governed?  Why does majority vote give legitimate power over even those who didn't vote for that power?
    The questions are different:  The moral legitimacy of the state to use force and the state's decisions imposing obligations on others.
    RD's argument:  When a state accepts integrity as a political ideal it is more legitimate than one that doesn't.  If that's true, we can see political practices as grounded in integrity - integrity will be fundamental in a conception of law.

Tacit Consent:  This is not a ground of authority simply because someone gives tacit consent (by remaining, by participating in a political process) because it is not possible for a person NOT to be subject to some form of government or other.

Duty to be Just:  A Rawlsian notion of a duty to be just, to support just institutions, is not enough.  Integrity is more personal than the concept of justice, which is universal, and so integrity can help to explain the more personal demands of different communities.  Integrity becomes the parent of legitimacy of government.

Fair Play:  Will this notion work?  No, even though it is better than the consent argument because it avoids the difficulties involved in the argument of a natural duty to justice.  Its problems are that 1) arguing for fair play assmes that people incur obligations for receiving benefits they didn't want or didn't know they were getting and 2) it is ambiguous in that it does not specify what it is that a person gets from a political organization.  There seems to be something like "care for a person's welfare" that the person would get that he wouldn't get without the organization.  This sort of thinking is too weak in the sense that it makes the Hobbesian sort of claim that people are better off under government than they would be with none at all.

Associative/Communal Obligations:  These are special responsibilities required by social practices in a biological or social group (families, neighbors).  Philosophers generally ignore this way of understanding obligations.  They do this probably because:  1) communal obligations depend on emotional bonds that can't apply in large communities and 2) special communal responsibilities sounds like nationalism, racism, or both.
    How far do these objections go?  Not very far.  These are important relationships - for most people their responsibilities to their friends and family, union or colleagues are most important, and the most consequential of all relationships.  Philosophers generally try to explain obligation in terms of contract, andthat isn't going to work - especially since many of these very close relationships, especially friendship, are not explicable in terms of choosing to accept obligations.  Taking friendship as the example, you notice that friendships don't begin with agreements, but they do grow and develop through a series of choices and events that no one really notices.
    But even academic colleagues are even less mattersof free choice.  We end up having responsibilities to them even when we didn't vote for them in a search committee.  Family members are even more clearly not by choice - people owe obligations to family members and these are matters of the least choice.
    The thing is that reciprocity is prominent in these relationships.

    The notion of reciprocity required for these relationships must be more abstract than the notion that "one good turn deserves another," or other such equality maintaining principles.  "Friends have a responsibility to treat one another as friends, and that means, put subjectively, that each must act out of a conception of friendship he is ready to recognize as vulnerable to an interpretive test, as open to the objection that this is not a plausible account of what friendship means in our culture.  Friends or family or neighbors need not agree in detail about the responsibilities attached to these forms of organization.  Associative obligations can be sustained among people who share a general and diffuse sense of members's special rights and responsibilities from or toward one another, a sense of what sort and level of sacrifice one may be expected to make for another."  Generally, "I will count (a person) a friend and feel this obligation (to him) only if I believe he has roughly the same concern for me as I thereby show for him, tht he would make important sacrifices for me of some other sort."
    So, what are genuine fraternal obligations?
    1.  The group's obligations are special - they exist in the group rather than duties to others outside it.
    2.  The group must accept that the responsibilities are personal - they don't go to the group as a whole.
    3.  Members have to see the responsibilities to others coming from a more general responsibility that each person has for concern for the well being of others in the group.
    4.  Members see concern as EQUAL concern for all members.
            Meeting this criteria distinguishes a bare (simple) community from a true (complex) community.

"Contrary to the assumption that seemed to argue against assimilating political to asosciative obligations, associative communities can be larger and more anonymous than they could be if it were a necessary condition that each member love all others, or even that they know them or who they are."  -- This is the sort of notion indicating that people in the group recognize the practice of asserting and acknowledging responsibilities.
    This means, too, that it is not the case that people become "members" of communities even when they don't want to be members when others want them to be.  "I wouldnot become a citizen of Fiji if people there decided for some reason to treat me as one of them.  Nor am I the friend of a stranger sitting next to me on a plane just because he decides he is a friend of mine." (227)

Communal obligations can be unjust by 1) being unjust to members of the group - equal concern is not present or is defective; 2) may be unjust to people outside the group.

It is not an objection to the notion of political obligation to say that one did not choose his country.  We don't choose our families, either, and though we choose our friendships, political community falls somewhere between these two conditions of association.

Three Models of community:
`1.  Circumstance - de facto community - accidental associations - not true community.

2.  Rule-book model/Compromise - a general commitment to obey rules - they are matters of obligation - the content of the rules exhausts obligation.  The rules are a compromise between antagonistic interests and points of view.

    These models of community reject integrity.

3.  Model of Principle - Governed by common principles, not simply rules given as a compromise.  This is a notion that one's obligations are not exhausted by following the ruels, but that obligations, rights and duties depend on principles endorsed and presupposed by the rules.
    This model satisfies all the conditons outlined above.  The responsibilities of citizenship are special - they are personal.  It expresses concern that is genuine and pervasive.  It tends toward equality - each person is of equal worth - each person must be treated with equal concern.  It accepts integrity.
    It is not necessary here that every person love every other.  It is good that it is this way.  "The general surrender of personality and autonomy it contemplates would leave people too little room for leading their own lives rather than being led along them; it would destroy the very emotion it celebrates.  Our lives are rich because they are complex in the layers and character of the communities we inhabit.  If we felt nothing more for lovers or friends or colleagues than the most intense concern we could possibly feel for all fellow citizens, this would mean the extinction not the univerality of love."
 

    John Locke's theory of obligation in the social contract tradition is the dominant theory in our society.  Basic outline of Lockean model of contract.

    The notion in social contract is that authority of government is better than the alternative of life without government.  The traditional contract theory holds that acceptance of government authority involves an agreement to obey the law.
    The ideal of the social contract employed by Locke is one in which a promise to obey is qualified by continuance of a democratic process and government not exceeding its rightful powers.  This is a "reflection of the liberal conception of human nature that emphasizes freedom and autonomy."
 
    Greenawalt's view:  Real promises have moral force - but even an unconditional promise can be broken in a morally appropriate way.

    Will not accept the notion of hypothetical agreements.  "A particular person, right now, can be obligated only if that person has undertaken to obey.  Our ancestors do not have the capacity to agree and promise for us, even if they have acted with the welfare of succeeding generations in mind."

    "The crucial question for any promissory theory is whether people now alive have promised to obey the law.  For this purpose, whether government was actually created by a process involving consent or originated through an exercise of force is not central.  What counts for an individual is whether he or she has promised to obey:  neither the unanimous agreement of those originally subject to the olegal order nor the agreement of most of one's fellow citizens can obligate an individual who has not agreed."

    Remaining in a country does not constitute consent - tacit or implied.  People stay where they are for a variety of reasons, including language, culture, job, friends, and family.  It may have nothing to do with consent at all.
    To claim that one has an obligation to obey because one accepts the benefits of a country in which he lives does not have morally binding force.   "Residents have no choice about many benefits:  for example, they cannot refuse the general security offered by police and military protection."

    Promises to obey:

1.  Conditions:  "If the person making a promise is not able to understand its significance, or is incapable of rational judgment, or is forced by a ver unpleasant and unfair alternative, the promise is without effect."
    "Imagine someone who correctly thinks that his government's compulsion is unfair and its demanded perfvormance immoral and who would be unwilling to promise to perform the duties were not a serious sanction the only alternative.  In that circumstance the requisites of duress - that is, strong and improper pressure producing an unfree choice - are present and the promise is without force."

2.  Terms:  A promise may be without force when there is defect in its substance - unfair exchange, unreasonable requirements, commission of immoral acts.
    Suppose that a person promises to obey into the indefinite future.  What is the character of this promise?  Analogy to marriage:
    "The analogy to marraige promises helps illustrate the truth that lies behind the objection to such promises (long-term).  External conditions and one's own attitudes and beliefs can change drastically over time.  People are much less to blame for abandoning commitments when circumstances have altered radically.  And irrevocable sweeping promise may well lose moral force slowly over time, and it carries more force for expected situations than for unexpected ones."
    "People do change  over time, and their undertakings of times long past should not exercise too great a restraint on their development.  The idea of diminishing force often better captures this normative judgment than the idea of an implied exception."
 
    There are some promises that have force even when they involve immoral acts. -- Example of lying to a friend vs. killing someone.  "Promises to do wrong can have force only if reliance on them by the promisee is reasonable; in this respect, the promise to kll and the promise to tell a minor lie are qualitatively different."

    "Insistence on promises can have the undesirable effect of underemphasizing the significance of other bases of duty to obey the law."  There is a point at which promising loses its force when every little detail of one's life and obligation becomes a matter of promising.