Research

Teaching

Writing Philosophy Papers

Biography

Personal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Research

Teaching

Writing Philosophy Papers

Biography

Personal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Research

Teaching

Writing Philosophy Papers

Biography

Personal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Research

Teaching

Writing Philosophy Papers

Biography

Personal

My C.V.

Click here for .pdf version.

General Research areas:

Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Ethics in Technology.

 

Research Interests:

I am principally engaged in examining the notion of representation in cognitive science, and the sometimes exclusive focus on the brain, at the expense of bodily, social, and technological factors, in investigations of the factors that enable human beings to do the neat things they can do.  I am especially concerned about reductive attempts to "naturalistically" explain the "aboutness" of representations and their content.

My principal concern is  with the inherently normative nature of representation (representations correctly represent some things and misrepresent other things).  I believe that this normativity cannot be reduced away, as many attempt.  It is derived from the normative practice of giving intentional states as reasons for actions. However, since the existence of human normative practices like this can be given a naturalistic explanation, this appeal to normativity is an appeal to a (non-reductively) naturalizable phenomenon.

I am also interested in issues involving augmented cognition and cognitive technology, based on Clark and Chalmers' defense of the "Extended Mind". At times, it makes sense to see "the cognitive system" as an entity that comprises brain body and relevant aspects of the world.  I am concerned with identifying the conditions under which this kind of analysis affords insight into human cognitive capacities, and with how these considerations affect "classical" cognitive science's (purported) explanations of cognition as computational operations on representations.  Do we have a univocal concept of "representation" or of "computation" if we continue to employ this paradigm?

I am also interested in the concept of moral responsibility as it applies to the "Extended Mind" debate. It seems that our ordinary concept of moral responsibility already include the notion that the agent responsible for an action may extend beyond the person's skin and skull.

I also write about speech act approaches to language, in particular advocating the role of "mindreading" skills (often referred to as "Theory of Mind") in understanding why people make the noises and markings they make (rather than focusing on the meanings of the words they utter or write).  I also concentrate on the role of social and pragmatic norms in linguistic interactions.  This has engendered an interest in connections between the evolution of language and the evolution of normativity. 

I also have a developing interest in computer-mediated communication and communities.  I am currently writing on the use of metaphor ("hacker is a burglar") to slant discussions of computer hacking.  I am also interested in questions involving socialization on-line, and about skill learning and embodiment in on-line learning environments --can skills be taught on-line?

Sample publications

Mason Cash, 2008. “Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, Normative Practices and Neurological Representations.” New Ideas in Psychology. Special Issue on Wittgenstein’s Relevance for Psychology. Eds. Tim Racine and Ulrich Müller.

Mason Cash, 2008. “The Normativity Problem: Evolution and Naturalized Semantics.”
Journal of Mind and Behavior Special Issue: Evolutionary Biology and the Central Problems of Cognitive Science. Ed. David L. Smith.  29(1 & 2).

Mason Cash, 2008 “Thoughts and Oughts.” Philosophical Explorations 11(2): 93-119.

Mason Cash, 2004b. “Artificial and Biological Intentionality.” History and Philosophy of Psychology Bulletin 16(2): 24-26.

Mason Cash 2004a. “Unconventional Utterances? Davidson’s Rejection of Conventions in Language Use” ProtoSociology 20: 285-319.

Mason Cash 2002. “Distancing Kantian Ethics and Politics from Kant’s Views on Women” Minerva: An Internet Journal of Philosophy 6(2): 103-150.

 

Teaching:

My Calendar:

 

Summer 2008

No official Office Hours:

Email me for an appointment. mcash@ucf.edu

Fall 2008:

PHI 3320: Philosophy of Mind (Fall 2008)

Description:

In this course we will critically examine philosophical articles that explore various theories, problems and arguments regarding the status of minds in the physical world and the relationships between mind, body and world. We will explore and discuss controversies including:

• The nature of the human mind
• The relationship between the mind and the brain
• Whether a physical machine (e.g. a computer) might genuinely think
• The extent to which the human mind/brain is like a computer
• What we can know and say about the mental lives of other people and the minds of animals
• Intentionality (the property of being about other things, a property only minds are supposed to have)
• The problems of giving a scientific account of subjectivity and consciousness

Sample: Course Syllabus Fall 2007 (pdf) (actual syllabus for the course in 2008 may be different)

Fall 2008 and Spring 2009:

PHI 3626: Ethics in Science and Technology

Description:

In this course, we will consider legal, ethical, social, and professional issues arising from the design, implementation, use and misuse of computers and information technology. The course principally aims at developing ethical reasoning skills and sensitivities to the myriad of issues that could arise for people who work with and use computers and information technology. Another objective is to better enable students to analyze and evaluate (often through discussion) the ethical and social implications of new innovations in computers and internet technology. While an interest in technology is expected, no particular technical knowledge is required beyond a general familiarity with computers and the internet.

Required Text

Herman Tavani, Ethics and Technology (Wiley, 2007).

Spring 2009:

Graduate: PHI 5325 Topics in Philosophy of Mind (Spring, 2009)
Undergraduate: PHI 4325

Topic for Spring 2009:

Representation in Mind and Language

Human beings think about things.  The common explanation for this ability to think about things is that the mind/brain contains representations that are about things.  The question of how these representations' “aboutness” (also called “intentionality”) could be compatible with a naturalistic world view is the center of a core dispute in philosophy of mind.  Being about something else is not a property that physical objects and processes typically have. Many theorists have offered diverse attempts to naturalistically explain the intentionality of mental representations. 

Representation is also a central concept in the Cognitive Sciences, in which cognition is often explained as computational processes operating on represented information.  There is a strong controversy about the extent to which cognition must involve representational brain states or processes.  Some argue that many, perhaps all, cognitive processes are not best conceptualized as representational processes.  Others defend representation as central to cognitive science explanations.

There is also much controversy over the relationship between mental and linguistic representations.  Does language represent because it elicits meaningful thoughts?  Or do people learn to think meaningful thoughts by being socialized into a linguistic community?  Is language or mind the primary form of intentionality? 

Alternatively, could it be the coupling between brains and external representations that thinks? If that were so, then might our minds not be confined to the insides of skin and skull, but extend into the external structures that support our cognition?

In this course we will critically examine the arguments of several of the most influential and original figures in these debates, including Jerry Fodor, Ruth Millikan, Robert Brandom, Daniel Dennett, Robert Cummins, John Haugeland, Brian Cantwell Smith and Andy Clark.  To get insight into the dynamic nature of the disagreements regarding mental representation, we will examine seminal papers from the above theorists, in addition to a book in which the latter five present, comment on, respond to, and debate one another’s views.  We will read representative papers by each theorist, followed by another theorist’s comments on that theorist's views, and then the original theorist’s reply and the ensuing discussion between the group of theorists.

Textbook: Philosophy of Mental Representation. Hugh Clapin (ed), (OUP, 2002). Browse it in Google Books here.

 

Writing Philosophy Papers

Advice about writing a philosophy paper, information about citations, and presentation advice.  Also contains links to some other web-sites relevant to writing philosophy papers.

Biographical Information

I am originally from Gisborne, a sunny beach paradise on the East Coast of the North Island of New Zealand. Gisborne is famous as the easternmost city in the world, and so first to see the sun of a new day. It has beaches facing southeast, east and northeast, so there is always good surfing nearby (it's a shame I never really got the hang of it).

The cliffs in the rightmost photo below are Young Nick's Head, named for the member of Captain Cook's ship Endeavour, who was the first to see New Zealand. The crew of that ship were the first Europeans to set foot on New Zealand soil, landing beneath Kaiti Hill, which you can see at the top of the central photo.

Images of Gisborne by Gray Clapham of designarts. His excellent books of Gisborne Photography can be obtained here.

In the distant past (1991) I also earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science and Electronics at Massey University, in New Zealand . I also completed Diploma of Humanities and Master of Philosophy degrees there.

I left NZ to complete a Ph. D. in Philosophy at the University of Alberta, Canada.

After that I spent three years teaching at Dalhousie University, in Nova Scotia Canada. 

Personal:

I am a member of the Luxuriant Flowing Hair Club for Scientists.

For those who wonder why I often don't wear shoes, two explanations: 

• It's comfortable and good for you. You get to experience all kinds of interesting textures (dewy grass, soft carpet, warm tarmac), it's better for your posture, and you are less likely to suffer many foot-related health conditions (as long as you have developed sufficient callouses and visual habits to either protect from or avoid hazards like nails and glass). See The Society for Barefoot Living for more information.

• It's also rather normal where I come from.  On the main street of my home town you'll see many barefoot people.  Think of it as a cultural norm from my home.  It isn't as weird as people around here often seem to think it is.

I sometimes train with the UCF Butokukan Club (combination of Tae Kwon Do, Aikido, and Japanese Swordsmanship).  I'm also the Faculty Advisor for the club.They are very friendly people to train with, and very good at what they do.  Training with them you will learn a lot, have a great workout, and have a lot of fun.  Feel free to ask me about more details.