Initial Arguments about the Nature of Justice – Republic Book I

Cephalus: Justice is giving to each his due.

Socrates’ response to Cephalus:

1) He defeats Cephalus’ definition by a simple counter-example: returning a knife to a madman is his due, but we would not say that was justice. (331)

Polemarchus (restates conventional view, not really offering anything original):

Justice is rendering to each what befits him: benefit to friends and harm to enemies.

Socrates’ response to Polemarchus:

In what capacity are we acting when we render benefits to friends and harm to enemies?

A physician renders these with respect to health, a pilot with respect to those at sea, but when does the just man render them?

(Polemarchus replies): During war – as an ally or an enemy.

But what if we aren’t at war? When is justice useful then?

(Polemarchus replies): In associations – especially money dealings, or when things are to be kept safe.

So when money and weapons are idle, then justice is useful, but not otherwise, so…

1) justice is a pretty useless thing, according to this definition.

Furthermore, says Socrates, we can be wrong about who are friends are, and who are enemies are, thereby resulting in doing the opposite of this definition, which means,

2) we could actually harm friends and benefit enemies, according to this definition;

(Polemarchus replies): But we have to change the definition so that we harm those who really are enemies and benefit those who really are friends.

But, says Socrates, if you harm a man, you make him a worse man, which is to say, a less just man. So, if Polemarchus is right, then

3) This definition could make unjust men even more unjust than they already are.

At this point, Polemarchus gives in and agrees with Socrates, but a definition of justice has not yet been reached. Next, Thrasymachus blusters into the debate.

Thrasymachus:

Justice is whatever suits the interest of the stronger. “Might makes right”. (This is the cynical view associated with the Sophists, whom Socrates’ loathes.)

Socrates response to Thrasymachus:

Rulers sometimes make mistakes about what is in their best interest. (Gets Thrasymachus to admit this.) Therefore,

1) Rulers could actually be unjust by mistake – by ordering their subjects to do things that aren’t in the rulers best interest.

Thrasymachus replies: Rulers are rulers only insofar as they don’t make mistakes. When they make mistakes, they aren’t rulers.

Socrates replies that if we are going to insist on the strict definition of the ruler, as Thrasymachus has just admitted, then we have to say that the function of the ruler is to rule, which means to attend to the welfare of the subjects, just as it is the function of a doctor to care for his patients. Insofar as either of these also earns other wages and benefits, they do so not in their professional function, but perhaps only as wage earners.

Thrasymachus explodes with his speech (343). Rather than trying to define justice, he is now attacking the assumption that justice itself is a worthwhile virtue (below)

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Thrasymachus tries again:

The just are always at a disadvantage when it comes to dealing with the unjust. The unjust are smarter than the just. Those who can be dishonest (overreach) on a large scale (tyranny) are in the best situation. Injustice conveys strength and brings happiness.

Socrates makes several related rejoinders to these points:

By analogy: a good flute player will not try to outdo a superior flute-player – he will recognize the superiority of the other. Only the ignorant would try to outdo his superior, therefore:

1) The just man, according to Thrasymachus’ definition, is like an ignorant man.

Furthermore, says Socrates,

2) even an unjust man must behave justly to a certain extent if he is in league with others (“honor among thieves”).

Furthermore, as to whether the unjust man is happiest, consider the function of a human soul. The excellence or virtue of a soul is justice, its defect is injustice (late line353). The just soul will live well, the unjust soul poorly. Furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and the contrary is so for he who does not live well. Therefore,

3) “the just [person] is happy and the unjust miserable”.