Final Exam Review: Chapter Summaries, Notes on The Lobotmist, and Glossary Terms

 

The cumulative Final Exam is Wednesday, December 9, 4-6:50 p.m., in the regular classroom.

 

Link to syllabus: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~jmundale/F09PhilPsychOnlineSyllabusBIGPrint.htm

 

 

Flanagan – Ch. 1, "Minds and Bodies" (Descartes)

 

- What is a reflex arc, and what does Descartes believe that a reflex arc can and can not explain?

 

- What is the covering-law model and what are its parts?

 

- On pp. 12-13, make sure you understand Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, know how Flanagan criticizes it, and know the Alpha and Beta assumptions – including why Flanagan rejects them.

 

- What are some of the consequences of Cartesian dualism for a science of the mind, according to Flanagan? (See pp. 21-2).

 

- What does Flanagan mean when he says (on p. 22), “We could, in effect, trade in metaphysical dualism for a less problematic epistemological dualism…”?

 

 

 

Flanagan – Ch. 2, "Naturalizing the Mind" (James)

 

- What does it mean to say that James’s theory of mind is naturalistic?

 

- Summarize how evolutionary theory figures in James’s theory of mind (see opening pages of chapter as well as p. 44). 

 

- How does James characterize consciousness, according to Flanagan?  (Be familiar with all of the characteristics, and also be able to list and explain 3-4 of them, as found on pp. 27-34). 

 

- James says that the word “consciousness” does not stand for a thing or an entity; so what does he think it stands for?  (see p. 45)

 

-  What are epiphenomenalism and parallelism?   Why does James reject them?

 

- What is compatibilism, and what does Flanagan have to say about it with respect to James’s view on free will?

 

- What is naturalistic emergentism? Did James subscribe to it, according to Flanagan?

 

- Be able to explain the experiment Flanagan cites in criticizing the method of introspection.

 



Flanagan -  Ch. 3, “Science and the Secret Self” (Freud)

 

- Flanagan raises the concern in this chapter that psychological theory may turn out to be culturally relative. Explain what he means by that, and provide some cases or illustrations that he points to as evidence that we should treat this as a real concern. Why should we care, from the standpoint of psychological science, whether psychological theory is culturally relative? 

 

- Familiarize yourself with the kind of strong materialism (type-type identity theory) that Freud espoused before 1895. Know the difference between type-type identity theory and toke-token identity theory.

 

- What is eliminative reductionism? According to Flanagan, why did Freud eventually reject eliminative reductionism?

 

- What is the Autonomy Thesis?

 

- What is intentionality?

 

- What is the Freudian picture of psychological explanation, according to Flanagan (see pp. 65-66)?

- What are parapraxes?  How did Freud explain them?

- What was the medical model of dreams that was available in Freud's day, and on what grounds did he reject that model? What significance did Freud attach to dreams?

 

- Explain falsifiability and corroborability, and also explain why they are considered to be important guidelines for scientific acceptability.

 

- Which aspects of Freud's theory are falsifiable, according to Flanagan? Which are not?  (see pp. 77-80).  Be able to explain why (or why not) in each case.

 

 

 

Flanagan -  Ch. 4, “The Science of Behavior”,  pp. 83-104 only, plus chapter summary (Skinner)

 

- What does Flanagan mean when he says that Skinner made psychology “epistemologically safe at the price of making it epistemologically impoverished”?  (p. 85)

 

- Be able to explain, in detail, what the “Theoretician’s Dilemma” is, and be able to explain two of the major objections to the theoretician’s dilemma that Flanagan covers.   (Make sure you can be specific about the objections, and can make clear why, exactly, they are an objection to the theoretician’s dilemma). 

 

- Be able to explain what operationism is, and why it is relevant to understanding behaviorism.

 

- Why does Flanagan say that the 1930’s were “a time of growing international epistemological conservatism” (p. 86), and why is that relevant to understanding Skinner?

 

- Review the final section, “Psychology and the Good Life”, and be able to say, briefly, how Skinner’s political views and psychological views were related.

 

- There will be an extra credit question dealing with Skinner on Self-Knowledge (see pp. 98-104), which we didn’t cover in discussion.

 

 

 

Flanagan -  Ch. 5, “The Case for Cognitive-Developmental Psychology” (emphasize Piaget)

 

- What, precisely, makes cognitive-developmental psychology “cognitive”, according to Flanagan?

 

- What, precisely, makes cognitive-developmental psychology “developmental”, according to Flanagan?

 

- In the context of cognitive-developmental psychology, what is Piaget’s objection to empiricism?

 

- In the context of cognitive-developmental psychology, what is Piaget’s objection to nativism?

 

- Know Piaget’s 5 major claims, as explained by Flanagan (pp. 126-7).  Be able to provide and explain 3 of them on your own, or be able to recognize all 5 if given those 5 among other options. 

 

- Be able to explain, in detail, each of the 4, major objections to Piaget that Flanagan discusses (pp. 127-133). 

 

- Be able to explain the example of “In One Ear and Out the Other”, and be able to explain at least two important points that the example helps to illustrate.

 

 

Flanagan, Ch. 6, “Cognitive Science”

 

- How does Flanagan define Cognitive Science, and what disciplines are a part of it?

 

-What is multiple realizability?  Why do cognitive scientists care about it?

 

- Searle’s Chinese Room:  What is it?  To what is it an objection, and what is the argument that constitutes the objection?   (pp. 255-258)  See especially four points pg. 256.  Know about Turing Test.

 

- Know the 3 levels of analysis, levels of explanation (Dennett): Physical, Design, Intentional.  (pp. 179-180)

 

- Know what a Transcendental Deduction is, p. 181, p. 183 (don’t memorize the steps).

 

- What was Kant’s contribution  to cognitive science?  (see transcendental deduction, also built-in mental structures or what we bring to experience, such as space and time for example).

 

- Know the Sternberg Reaction Time Studies:

        - 1) Mind’s Eye Sees All

        - 2) Self-Terminating Serial Search

        -3) Exhaustive Serial Search

Intuitively, we might guess that we do this by #2, but evidence favors #3. 

Note: Sternberg (or Flanagan) doesn’t mention possibility of a quick re-ordering in our minds before search begins.  These reaction time studies are an example of a transcendental deduction, which is to say, an induction (pp. 185-6).  They are also an example of how we lack insight into how we do things (a mark against process Cartesianism, p. 194)

 

Know the section on Cartesian Self-Knowledge  pp. 194-5

 

1) Simple Cartesianism – it’s probably so

 

2) State Cartesianism – probably not so, can be in other states than you are aware of, if say you’re happy but fail to act happy, heterophenomenology may override your claim

 

3) Content Cartesianism – If #2 is false, #3 probably is also.  Also, Lackner and Garrett experiments tell against it.

 

4) Causal Cartesianism – p. 198 (Nisbett and Ross experiments, people less likely to help others as the no. of bystanders increases, Halo effect, so not aware of causes of our states, only occasionally plausible).

 

5) Process Cartesianism – No one believes it – see p. 195 We don’t know how we do things.

 

 

 

Notes and Questions for The Lobotomist

 

- Know who Freeman, Watts and Moniz are and what role they played in the development of lobotomy.

 

- Know Freeman’s initial procedure for lobotomy vs. the one her “perfected” for large-scale use.

 

- Know the common side-effects of lobotomy.

 

- Have a general sense of Freeman’s career overall – his personal characteristics, when he was active, under what circumstances he would perform lobotomies, some cases that were highlighted in the documentary, roughly how many he performed, etc.

 

- Think about some of the major philosophical questions raised by this documentary, such as the following:

 

- “Under what circumstances, if any, do we impose psychological treatment on an unknowing and/or unwilling person?”

 

-  “What do we value about being human?” 

 

- “Is the elimination of mental pain and suffering a reasonable goal for psychiatry, or are those part of human life?”, etc. 

 

- Is there any ethical justification for any aspect of what Freeman did?

 

- What are the ontological assumptions about the mind that underwrite surgical intervention in the case of mental illness?

 

- What, if anything, could medical science be said to “know” about the anticipated effects and medical results of lobotomy as it was first instituted? 

 

- Are there any contemporary parallels to the Freeman cases?

 

-Apart from the above, what do you consider to be an important discussion issue raised by this documentary?

 

 

Glossary of Terms (we’ve covered all these before, but this compiles them in one place):

 

Epistemology: That branch of philosophy which has to do with the limits, extent, and basis of human knowledge. (The theory of knowledge)
 

Empiricism: An epistemological theory which asserts that all knowledge ultimately derives from the senses.
 

Skepticism: An epistemological theory which says that we can know little or nothing with certainty.

 

Rationalism: An epistemological theory which asserts that all knowledge ultimately derives from logic, reason, or other operations of the mind
 

Ontology: That branch of philosophy which studies what exists, what is ultimately real in the universe. (The theory of being)
 

Monism: An ontological view which asserts that there is only one ultimately real sort of thing in the universe.
 

Dualism: An ontological view which asserts that there are only two ultimately real kinds of thing in the universe (typically mind and body).
 

Pluralism: When used in the context of ontology, this view asserts that there are more than two ultimately real kinds of things in the universe.
 

Materialism: A monistic ontological theory which asserts that matter (physical substance) is all that is ultimately real in the universe.
 

Idealism: A monistic ontological theory which asserts that ideas, or mental entities are all that is ultimately real in the universe.
 

The Mind/Body Problem: This problem arises for a dualist such as Descartes, who asserts that both mind (mental substance) and body (physical substance) are real; this presents the difficulty of explaining how the mind interacts with the body. In other words, how does the mind (an unextended, non-physical substance) cause the body (an extended, physical substance) to act?
 

Intentionality: This refers to the "aboutness" of mental states. In part, this is what makes mental states different from physical things, in that a thought, attitude, emotion, desire, or belief is generally said to be "about" something; whereas chairs and rocks are not.
 

Multiple Realizability: Most functionalists believe that a given mental state is multiply realizable, meaning that the same mental state can be instantiated or realized in many different kinds of physical entities. A famous example of multiple realizability comes from Putnam: I can be hungry, and an octopus can be hungry, so we can both be in the same mental states, yet we are in very different physical states. This argument was used against strong identity theory and was also used to downplay the explanatory role of neuroscience. Recently, the doctrine of multiple realizability has been very strongly attacked by philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. 
 

Behaviorism: For a behaviorist, mental states are to be understood in terms of specific behaviors. To be in pain, for example, means to behave as if one is in pain. Although there is a wide variety of behaviorist theories, they all attempt to avoid talk about mental states favor of talk about behavior, which is publicly observable.


Identity Theory
: For identity theorists, mental states are identified with physical states; specifically, brain states. Identity theorists disagree over the strength and specificity of the identity in question. Strong identity theorists hold that there are regular and specific, one-to-one correlations between kinds of mental states and kinds of brain states. For an identity theorist, to be in pain means that one is in a specific kind of physical (brain) state.  


Functionalism
: Functionalists understand mental states not so much in terms of what they consist of, ontologically, but rather what they do - i.e., how they function with respect to other inputs and outputs. These other inputs and outputs may include other thoughts, environmental stimuli, behaviors, etc. For a functionalist, for example, pain is to be understood as the functional intermediary between such inputs as hitting one's thumb with a hammer, and such outputs as screaming "ouch!".


Cognitive Science
: A multi-disciplinary field developed in the 20th century to study the processes and activities of the mind and brain, particularly those having to do with intellect, emotion, and rationality. Some of the most important disciplines which contribute to cognitive science are philosophy, neuroscience, computer science, psychology, and linguistics. Other fields, such as sociology and anthropology may also play a role in cognitive science.